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GHOST IN THE “NEW MACHINE”: 
HOW ALICE EXPOSED  
SOFTWARE PATENTING’S CATEGORY MISTAKE 
 
Andrew Chin* 
 
The Alice Court’s characterization of computer programming has 
effectively repudiated, inter alia, the doctrine that programming a 
general-purpose computer creates a patent-eligible “new 
machine.” This Article revisits In re Bernhart, the first holding 
based on the “new machine” principle, concluding that the Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals committed a category mistake in 
conducting its nonobviousness analysis. This suggests that § 101 
has a unique role to play in ensuring the analytical coherence of 
the other tests for patentability, and that step two of the 
Mayo/Alice test could helpfully enforce the doctrinal distinction 
between a patent-eligible “method or means” and an unpatentable 
“result or effect.” 
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I.  THE “NEW MACHINE” RATIONALE 
In re Alappat, 1  once a mainstay of the Patent Office’s 
Guidelines for Examining Computer-Related Inventions,2 and its 
doctrinal principle that programming a general-purpose computer 
creates a patent-eligible “new machine”3 are already fading into 
history. Not much was left of this principle after the Federal 
Circuit reviewed Alice’s patents en banc,4 and even less remains 
now that the Supreme Court has concluded “mere recitation of a 
generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea 
into a patent-eligible invention.”5 Consequently, the agency’s post-
Alice Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility6 makes 
                                                
1 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
2 See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 
7478 (Feb. 28, 1996) (citing Alappat nine times). 
3 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (citation omitted) (“We have held that such programming creates a new 
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special 
purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions 
pursuant to instructions from program software.”). 
The Alappat court also reasoned that the claimed programmed general-
purpose computer was “not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be 
characterized as an ‘abstract idea,’ but rather a specific machine to produce a 
useful, concrete, and tangible result.” Id. at 1544. It was not until State Street 
Bank, however, that the Federal Circuit elevated Alappat’s “useful, concrete, 
and tangible result” language into a test for patent-eligibility. State St. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar 
amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final 
share price, constitutes a [patent-eligible invention] because it produces ‘a 
useful, concrete and tangible result. . . .”) Since the Federal Circuit abrogated 
this test in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60, it has no bearing on Alappat’s “new 
machine” principle as discussed in this Article. 
4 See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (Lourie, J.) (plurality opinion) (“Not only has the world of technology 
changed, but the legal world has changed. The Supreme Court has spoken since 
Alappat on the question of patent eligibility, and we must take note of that 
change.”). 
5 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).  
6 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Interim Guidance on Patent 
Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter 
Interim Guidance]. 
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no mention of Alappat, the leading case in support of the 
principle.7 In its place are lists of examples purporting to illustrate 
the otherwise undefined8 category of unpatentable abstract ideas9 
and the kinds of additional claim elements that may provide the 
requisite “significantly more” to impart patent-eligibility.10 
Yet Alappat has lessons to impart before it is sent into oblivion. 
First, Alappat remains an important precedent concerning the 
interpretation of functional language in software patent claims 
under § 112(f). As argued elsewhere,11 the Federal Circuit’s claim 
construction in that case is both rhetorically and logically 
unconnected to the “new machine” principle, and properly 
illustrates the kinds of computer technologies that may be found 
sufficiently concrete in a specification to support a claimed means-
plus-function element.12 
Second, it is time for patent-eligibility doctrine to recognize the 
now-discredited “new machine” principle for what it has always 
been: an abdication of § 101’s13 essential role in guarding against 
mistakes that could otherwise arise in the patentability analysis of 
software-implemented inventions. Dissenting in In re Bilski,14 the 
Federal Circuit’s former Chief Judge Randall Rader suggested 
such a role for patentable subject matter doctrine in finding Bilski’s 
hedging claim facially abstract without resorting to the en banc 
majority’s machine-or-transformation test: 
When considering the eligibility of “processes,” this court should focus 
on the potential for an abstract claim. Such an abstract claim would 
                                                
7 See id. at 74624.  
8 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (“In any event, we need not labor to delimit the 
precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”); Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593, 621 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court, in sum, never 
provides a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract 
idea.”). 
9 See Interim Guidance, supra note 6, at 74622. 
10 See id. at 74624. 
11 Andrew Chin, Alappat Redux: Support for Functional Language in Software 
Patent Claims, 66 SMU L. REV. 491, 500 (2013). 
12 Id. at 500–01. 
13 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
14 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
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appear in a form that is not even susceptible to examination against 
prior art under the traditional tests for patentability. Thus this court 
would wish to ensure that the claim supplied some concrete, tangible 
technology for examination. Indeed the hedging claim at stake in this 
appeal is a classic example of abstractness. . . . Hedging is a fundamental 
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and 
taught in any introductory finance class. In any event, this facially 
abstract claim does not warrant the creation of new eligibility 
exclusions.15 
Judge Rader’s approach merits close study, because the Supreme 
Court’s Bilski majority essentially adopted it in its own opinion 
rejecting the machine-or-transformation test.16 
Even before Alice,17 the “new machine” principle had been 
criticized often enough to earn the derisory nickname “The Old 
                                                
15 Id. at 1013. 
16 Judge Rader prefigured the Supreme Court’s rejection of the en banc 
majority’s project of elevating machine-or-transformation from a clue to a 
definitive test, and took existing Supreme Court precedents as sufficient 
guideposts for finding Bilski’s claimed method to be “facially abstract.” Id. at 
1013. The sole factual basis underlying the Supreme Court majority’s rejection 
of Bilski’s claims was Judge Rader’s characterization of hedging. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 606 (citing In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d at 1015) (agreeing with Judge Rader’s findings of “difficulties” with 
the en banc majority’s machine-or-transformation test). The Court proceeded 
immediately from this characterization to the conclusion that Bilski’s claims 
were unpatentably abstract, just as Judge Rader had done. Id. 
Underscoring the fundamental importance of this analytical mistake-avoiding 
function is the fact that Judge Rader’s post-Bilski opinions generally take a 
narrow view of the abstract-idea exclusion, limiting its application to where 
abstractness “exhibit[s] itself so manifestly so as to override the broad statutory 
categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs 
primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.” 
Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Ultramercial v. Hulu, 722 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, 134 
S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (citing Research Corp.). In fact, Judge Rader’s dissent in 
Alice may turn out to be the last Federal Circuit opinion to cite Alappat for its 
“new machine” rationale. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 
1302 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544–
45). Abstractness in patent claims appears, to Judge Rader’s mind at least, to 
exhibit itself most manifestly in the form of analytical errors inherent in 
applying “the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.” 
17 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014). 
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Piano Roll Blues.”18 The implied comparison, as the government 
argued in Gottschalk v. Benson, was to “the insertion of a new 
piano roll into an old player piano,” which may enable the piano to 
play a new song, but should not be considered “a patentable 
‘discovery.’”19 Former Chief Judge Glenn Archer’s Alappat dissent 
appealed to the analogy at length, concluding that “[t]he only 
invention by the creator of a roll that is new because of its music is 
the new music,”20 which is nonstatutory subject matter. Still, the 
player-piano characterization of the “new machine” principle 
played no role in the Alice decision, nor did it offer any insight into 
the nature of the patent-eligibility inquiry after Alice. 
This Article offers a new and more constructive criticism of the 
“new machine” principle: i.e., that it provided an opening for the 
kinds of category mistakes in patentability analysis that § 101 
should serve to prevent, and that its repudiation in Alice should be 
an occasion for doctrinal realignment with this mistake-preventing 
purpose. Part II provides a brief explanation of category mistakes 
and the analytical difficulties they present for the law generally and 
patent law specifically. Part III traces the “new machine” principle 
back to its origin in In re Bernhart,21 in which the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals made the category mistake of 
concluding that six pages of algebraic simplifications were too 
difficult for “one of ordinary mathematical skill” to perform.22 
As Part IV discusses, Alice is irreconcilable with the “new 
machine” principle and the patent-eligibility determination in 
Bernhart. This suggests that the two-step patent-eligibility test 
outlined in Alice23 and Mayo24 could be coherently focused on the 
salutary purpose of preventing future category mistakes in 
patentability analysis. Consistent with Supreme Court software 
                                                
18 Old Piano Roll Blues, PETER GROVES, A DICTIONARY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 220 (2011). 
19 Government’s Opening Brief, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
20 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1567 (Archer, J., dissenting). 
21 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
22 See id. at 1402. 
23 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
24 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297–
98 (2012). 
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patent doctrine, the abstract-idea exclusion could enforce the 
longstanding distinction between a patent-eligible “method or 
means” and an unpatentable “result or effect.” Part V concludes 
with a brief discussion of future work. 
II.  AN INTRODUCTION TO CATEGORY MISTAKES 
This section introduces category mistakes and the doctrinal 
difficulties that result from them. This Article will argue Alice’s 
repudiation of the “new machine” principle should be viewed as an 
opportunity for the patent system to recognize § 101’s role in 
preventing category mistakes in patentability analysis. Over the 
centuries, various philosophers have attempted to answer the 
question “What is there?” by classifying the world’s entities25 into 
broad ontological categories26 that can be the subject of meaningful 
discourse.27 Two criteria for a successful classification are that 
(1) the set of categories is complete, i.e., each entity in the world 
belongs to one and only one category; and (2) attributes are 
category-specific; i.e., an attribute that can belong to entities in one 
category cannot be an attribute of entities in any other category.28 
A category mistake occurs when an entity is placed in the 
wrong category or is given an attribute that only entities in another 
category can have.29 “This memory is violet,”30 “Caesar is a prime 
number,”31 and “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously”32 are examples 
                                                
25 An entity is “something that exists by itself” or “something that is separate 
from other things.” Entity Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entity (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
26 Ontological knowledge is “one’s conception of the basic categories of 
existence, of what sort of things there are.” FRANK C. KEIL, SEMANTIC AND 
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 457 (1979). 
27 The first such effort is credited to Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, CATEGORIES 
(J.L. Ackrill trans., 1963) (listing substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, 
date, posture, state, action, and passion). 
28 Category, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 122–23 (Robert 
Audi ed., 1999). 
29 Id. at 123. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Noam Chomsky, Three Models for the Description of Language, 2 IRE 
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 113 (1956). 
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of category mistakes as they often manifest themselves in 
unintelligible or absurd discourse. 
Some category mistakes, however, are exposed only through 
deeper analysis. A famous example is Gilbert Ryle’s argument 
against Rene Descartes’s mind-body dualism, which he 
characterized as “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine:” 
[The dogma] maintains that there exist both bodies and minds; that 
there occur physical processes and mental processes; that there are 
mechanical causes of corporeal movements and mental causes of 
corporeal movements.33 
Ryle’s critique depends on a more extensive argument that 
physical processes and mental processes belong to distinct 
categories, so that “it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the 
two.”34 That is to say, Descartes commits a category mistake. 
Similarly, as Steven Smith argued in Law’s Quandary, the 
ontological categories constructed by law can obscure even 
pervasive gaps between a society’s consciously held beliefs about 
ontological categories and “the ontological assumptions that are 
implicit or presupposed in practice and ways of talking.”35 Lawyers 
and laypeople alike speak of “the law” as if it were a real entity,36 
but it is far from clear that the legal community can account for 
“the law” in a careful inventory of its ontological commitments.37 
We may all be speaking “nonsense.” 38  For example, Smith 
problematizes the writing of dissenting opinions, noting that they 
“typically assert that the majority has misstated the law . . . . What 
could this kind of talk mean if the judicial decision is law?”39 
A recent article40 conducted an inventory of the ontological 
commitments surrounding the category of “useful Arts” in the 
discourse of patent law, in which “claims are novel kinds of 
                                                
33 GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 11 (Julia Tanney ed., 2009). 
34 Id. at 11–12. 
35 STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 16 (2007). 
36 Id. at 13. 
37 Id. at 19–22. 
38 Id. at 30. 
39 Id. at 58 (emphasis in original). 
40 See generally Andrew Chin, The Ontological Function of the Patent Document, 
74 U. PITT. L. REV. 263 (2012). 
630 N.C. J.L. & TECH.  [VOL. 16: 623 
embodiments; and embodiments are entities whose properties 
include essential causal powers, and whose possible existence is 
therefore warranted by scientific essentialism and scientific 
realism.”41 A wide range of patent doctrines, including patentable 
subject matter, utility, anticipation, infringement, constructive 
reduction to practice, written description, enablement, and claim 
construction all support this ontological picture.42 
Following naturally from patent law’s long-recognized status 
as “the most metaphysical branch of modern law,”43 its adherence 
to this system of ontological commitments through so many 
doctrinal ramifications necessitates a distinctive role for the 
patentable subject matter requirement in policing against category 
mistakes.44 Like Descartes’s “Ghost in the Machine,”45 the “new 
machine” principle is a dogma that falsely conjoins mathematical 
inferences with the category of “useful Arts”: a category mistake 
that, in Bernhart, had spectacularly far-reaching consequences. It 
should have had no place in § 10146 doctrine. We now turn to that 
story. 
III.  THE CATEGORY MISTAKE IN BERNHART 
Despite the importance of the Bernhart case to the histories of 
both software patents and computer technology, it has received 
little attention in contemporary debates over the patenting of 
software. But the “new machine” principle it articulated and the 
category mistake it allowed continued to hold legal significance for 
nearly four decades. 
In 1961, Boeing employees Walter Bernhart and Bill Fetter 
                                                
41 Id. at 323. 
42 Id. 
43 Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. 437, 485–86 (1848); see also Rohm & Haas Co. 
v. Dawson Chemical Co., 599 F.2d 685, 706 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Judge Rich’s 
comment that “patent law is ‘the metaphysics’ of the law”). 
44 See Chin, supra note 40, at 268 (“The advantage of such an approach is that 
any resulting doctrinal proposals can find warrant not only on policy grounds 
but also importantly as metaphysically necessary consequences of settled legal 
principles.”). 
45 See RYLE, supra note 33. 
46 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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filed a patent application 47  for a computer system capable of 
drawing two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional 
objects. Bernhart and Fetter, who are credited with coining the 
term “computer graphics,”48 would have to wait eight years for the 
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to award them their 
patent.49 Hundreds of firms, including Disney, expressed interest in 
licensing the technology,50 and Computerworld heralded the issued 
patent as “the first true software patent.”51 
Bernhart and Fetter’s claimed system included a “general-purpose 
digital computer” programmed to calculate a series of coordinates 
)},{( ii wv  representing the projections of object points )},,{( iii zyx  
from a viewpoint ),,( eee zyx onto the plane located at k  times the 
distance from the viewpoint to the origin and normal to the line 
between them. The calculation was to be based on the formulas: 
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The system also included a planar “plotting machine” for 
plotting the points )},{( ii wv  on paper. The “plotting machine” 
could use any known output technology for this purpose, including 
ink pens, cathode ray photography, or electrostatic paper.52 
The Patent Office had rejected the system claims under § 101 
because their point of novelty consisted of the mathematical 
equations used to program the computer.53 On appeal, the U.S. 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals acknowledged that equations 
were excluded from patentable subject matter, but found that the 
                                                
47 U.S. Patent No. 3,519,997 (filed Nov. 13, 1961). 
48 39 COMM. ARTS MAG. 216 (1997). 
49 See In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
50 Firm Wins Battle for Mechanical Cartoonist Patent, GREAT BEND DAILY 
TRIB., May 1, 1970, at 1. 
51 COMPUTERWORLD, July 29, 1970, at 2. 
52 See U.S. Patent No. 3,519,997 at cols. 4-6 (filed Nov. 13, 1961). 
53 Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1398. 
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system claims in issue would not preempt all uses of the recited 
equations:  
[A] member of the public would have to do much more than use the 
equations to infringe any of these claims. He would have to use them in 
the physical equipment recited in the claim . . . . We should not 
penalize the inventor who makes his invention by discovering new and 
unobvious mathematical relationships which he then utilizes in a 
machine, as against the inventor who makes the same machine by trial 
and error and does not disclose the laws by which it operates.54  
The comparison between the two inventors here appeals to the 
longstanding principle that a patent applicant has no duty to 
disclose a correct theory of operation.55 In making the comparison, 
the court’s implication was that Bernhart and Fetter had not only 
invented a new machine, but had performed a further public 
service of disclosing its theory of operation, over and above the 
amount of disclosure needed to patent it. In this account, the 
mathematical equations played no part in the invention’s patent-
eligibility, which turned solely on the invention’s characterization 
as a new machine.  
The court then made the characterization explicit by way of 
invoking the “new machine” principle for the first time as a 
rationale for patent-eligibility: 
[I]f a machine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious way, it is 
physically different from the machine without that program; its 
memory elements are differently arranged. The fact that these physical 
changes are invisible to the eye should not tempt us to conclude that the 
machine has not been changed. If a new machine has not been invented, 
certainly a “new and useful improvement” of the unprogrammed 
machine has been . . . . We are concluding here that such machines are 
statutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and that claims defining them must be 
judged for patentability in light of the prior art.56 
                                                
54 Id. at 1399–1400 (emphasis omitted). 
55 See Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581–82 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
56 Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1400. The court subsequently characterized the 
“physical changes” resulting from programming a computer in categorical 
terms, stating “once a program has been introduced, the general-purpose digital 
computer becomes a special-purpose digital computer.” In re Prater, 415 F.2d 
1393, 1403 n. 29 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (dicta); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 
1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing Prater) (“We have held that such 
programming creates a new machine, because a general purpose computer in 
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The court proceeded to review the Patent Office’s § 103 
rejection of the Bernhart and Fetter’s claims in light of the prior 
art. Unbeknownst to the Boeing scientists, a very similar patent 
application, filed in 1960 by Bernard Taylor, Jr., was already 
pending in the Patent Office.57 Taylor had claimed a system with 
special-purpose circuitry for calculating and outputting the coordinates 
of a planar projection of a three-dimensional object. Taylor’s 
circuits calculated the coordinates ),( 21 ff  representing the projections 
of an object point ),,( 321 cccC =  from a viewpoint ),,( 321 aaaA =  
onto the plane passing through the point ),,( 321 bbbB =  and normal 
to the line between this point and the viewpoint. Taylor’s application 
disclosed the following expressions for 1f  and 2f : 
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When rewritten solely in terms of A  and C  (with B  set to the 
origin), these expressions simplify to the following representations 
                                                                                                         
effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform 
particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.”). 
57 U.S. Patent No. 3,153,224 (filed Feb. 23, 1960). 
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of Bernhart and Fetter’s equations: 
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In fact, an enterprising patent examiner performed these 
algebraic simplifications over six pages of manuscript, showing 
that for ),,(),,( 321 eee kzkykxaaa = and (c1,c2,c3) = (xi, yi, zi ),  
Taylor’s formulas calculate the same projection coordinates 
( f2, f1) = (vi,wi ) .58 Accordingly, the Patent Office rejected Bernhart 
and Fetter’s claims as obvious over Taylor’s application59 in light 
of known programmed computer systems with plotters.60 
The court was not persuaded by the Patent Office’s algebra, 
finding that it amounted to a hindsight reconstruction of Bernhart 
and Fetter’s equations: 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that there was any possibility 
of the simplified programming claimed by the applicants in claim 19. 
The Patent Office belatedly . . . attempts to show that Taylor's 
equations can be manipulated to an identity with the [applicants’] 
equations . . . . In so doing the solicitor has had the benefit of seeing 
applicants' equations, and with this hindsight a mathematical identity is 
revealed. There is nothing to suggest that, within the context of 
automated drawing, one of ordinary mathematical skill armed with the 
Taylor reference would be able to discover the simpler equations which 
are the basis of the claimed programming.61 
Hindsight is a legitimate concern for courts and patent examiners 
when inquiring into whether a claimed invention was nonobvious 
at the time it was made.62 In formulating an obviousness rejection, 
there can be a “temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of 
                                                
58 Brief for the Commissioner of Patents at 13–18, In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 
1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
59 See id. at 6.  
60 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,066,868 (filed Nov. 15, 1956). 
61 Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1402. 
62 KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). 
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the invention in issue,”63 thereby understating the difficulty of the 
problem that would have faced a person having ordinary skill in 
the art at the time of invention. The Bernhart court’s 
characterization of the patent examiner’s calculations, however, is 
strained at best.  
 
Figure 1 - Graphical representation of Bernhart and Fetter’s projection equations. 
The reason Bernhart and Fetter’s equations are simpler than 
Taylor’s is that the former apply only to the special case where the 
normal from the viewpoint (26 in Figure 1) to the projection plane 
(28) passes through the origin (30). Once the coordinates 321 ,, bbb  
drop out of Taylor’s equations, the expressions are greatly simplified, 
and it is a straightforward exercise in first-year algebra to solve for 
1f  and 2f  in terms of A  and C . From these simplified equations, 
expressing )},{( ii wv  in terms of )},,{( iii zyx , ),,( eee zyx  and k  
requires only a change of notation. Bernhart and Fetter’s equations 
                                                
63 See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966). 
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immediately follow from Taylor’s prior art disclosure as a special 
case, at least to one of ordinary skill in ninth-grade mathematics.64 
In short, the court’s determination as to what a person of “ordinary 
mathematical skill” would be able to do with a particular set of 
algebraic equations is problematic, because it grossly 
underestimates the mathematical abilities of the patent’s intended 
audience. 
Even more fundamentally, the court’s notion of an inventor 
“discovering new and unobvious mathematical relationships” and 
its interposition of “mathematical skill” for the predicate of 
“ordinary skill in the art” constitute category mistakes. This is 
because the attributes of nonobviousness and ordinary skill in the 
art are inapplicable to the mathematical derivation of equations 
(and the category of the mathematical arts more generally). As the 
Supreme Court acknowledged in Flook and reiterated in Bilski, 
even previously unknown mathematical properties must be 
“assumed to be within the prior art” at the outset of a patentability 
determination. 65  Moreover, a § 103 66  inquiry into the level of 
ordinary skill in the art67 is misplaced where the art in question, 
and the field of knowledge being advanced by the patent 
disclosure, is not one of the “useful Arts,” but mathematics.68 The 
patentability analysis of a claimed software-implemented invention 
                                                
64 The nonobviousness analysis is not changed by characterizing Bernhart and 
Fetter’s as a species selected from a prior art genus. See generally MPEP 
2144.08 (9th ed., Mar. 2014). On the other hand, Taylor’s equations are not 
readily deducible from Bernhart and Fetter’s disclosure, which offers no 
indication as to how to calculate the coordinates of a projection onto a plane 
located elsewhere in space.  
65 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 
610 (2010) (quoting Flook). 
66 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
67 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
68 See id. at 6 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (“Innovation, advancement, 
and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a 
patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of 
. . . useful Arts.’”). 
Since the claimed system in Bernhart becomes obvious once the “new” 
equations are assumed to be within the prior art, it also fails the historical 
requirement that “a patent-eligible invention must reflect invention in the 
application of otherwise ineligible science, nature, or ideas.” Joshua D. Sarnoff, 
Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 
53, 72 (2011). 
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should never leave a court in the position of determining how hard 
the math was. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
A. Bernhart in Light of Alice (and Vice Versa) 
There can be little doubt that Bernhart would have been 
decided differently after Alice. The claims in Bernhart are facially 
directed to patent-ineligible mathematical equations. The 
remaining system elements are recited in means-plus-function 
format69 and supported in the specification by broad disclosures of 
“a general-purpose digital computer,” “a plotting machine,” “the 
input devices of the computer,” and “the output of the computer.”70 
A representative figure from the disclosure is reprinted in Figure 2.71 
Read together, these claim elements constitute only a “wholly 
generic computer implementation” 72  that “cannot transform a 
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”73 
Under Alice, a general-purpose computer programmed to evaluate 
mathematical formulas would not have been characterized as a 
“new machine” but rather as an unpatentable abstract idea. This 
conclusion to the § 101 analysis would have obviated Bernhart’s 
category mistake in its § 103 inquiries. 
 
Figure 2. Block diagram of Bernhart and Fetter’s claimed system. 
                                                
69 See U.S. Patent No. 3,519,997, supra note 47, at cols. 1–3. 
70 Id. at col. 4. 
71 See id. at fig. 1. 
72 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014). 
73 Id.  
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Bernhart thus reveals a previously hidden role for the 
patent-eligible subject matter inquiry after Alice: preventing future 
category mistakes in connection with “examination against prior 
art under the traditional tests for patentability.”74 When conducting 
the Alice/Mayo analysis in light of this role, however, not all cases 
will be as clear as Bernhart, even within the limited field of 
software-implemented inventions.75 Fortunately, a doctrine dating 
from the Industrial Revolution and reaffirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Diamond v. Diehr76 can supply the ontological distinctions 
necessary to illuminate the potential for category mistake. 
B. The “Method or Means” Requirement 
Since at least the 1850s, patent-eligibility has required that 
claims be limited to a particular method or means for bringing 
about a desired effect, rather than the effect itself. 77  Diehr 
                                                
74 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J., 
dissenting). 
75 For an empirical survey of the diverse levels of abstraction involved in the 
technical disclosures of “software patents,” see Martin Campbell-Kelly & 
Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fifty Software Patents, 9 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249 (2005). 
76 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
77 LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A patent is not good for an 
effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit all other persons 
from making the same thing by any means whatsoever. This, by creating 
monopolies, would discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy 
of the patent laws.”). In Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1853), the 
Supreme Court extended this principle to machines as well as processes, stating, 
“It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of 
producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the 
result or effect itself.” 
Joshua Sarnoff has pointed to an even earlier expression of the “method or 
means” requirement in Justice Story’s 1840 decision in Wyeth v. Stone. In that 
case, Justice Story found that a patent could not validly be “for any mode 
whatsoever of cutting ice by means of an apparatus, worked by power, not 
human, in the abstract, whatever it may be . . . .” Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 
723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840). Such a patent, Story reasoned, “is void, as it is 
for an abstract principle, and broader than the invention, which is only cutting 
ice by one particular mode, or by a particular apparatus or machinery.” Id. 
According to Sarnoff, Story’s reasoning amounted to a holding that a claimed 
invention was limited to “only the inventive mode or apparatus embodying the 
patented principle that was actually disclosed in the patent specification.” Joshua 
D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the 
Future, Part I (1790–1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 390 
(2005) (citing Wyeth). 
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reaffirmed this bedrock principle for the software era. 78  This 
distinction between a practical “method or means” and a beneficial 
“result or effect” provides the requisite ontological categories for 
identifying impermissibly abstract product and process claims 
under my proposed approach. 
The “method or means” requirement calls for a simple inquiry 
into causality. A “method or means” is capable of making some 
beneficial difference in the state of the world because of its use. A 
“result or effect” that obtains in the world regardless of whether or 
not such an intervening act takes place, in contrast, is “part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none”79 and therefore cannot be preempted 
from the public domain as the subject matter of a patent.80 This 
preemption concern extends to claims that effectively cover all 
applications of such a “result or effect” in a particular field of use 
or technological environment, or additionally recite only 
insignificant extra-solution activity.81 
For example, consider the Pythagorean Theorem, a 
paradigmatic example of an unpatentable abstract idea. 82  The 
Pythagorean Theorem does not cause the square of the hypotenuse 
of a right triangle to be the sum of the squares of the legs, although 
it explains why this is so. Nor was this proposition caused by 
Pythagoras or by any of the hundreds of other mathematicians who 
have furnished proofs over the centuries.83 Rather, the Pythagorean 
Theorem and its proofs simply reveal a relationship that has always 
existed among the sides of a right triangle regardless of human 
intervention. 
                                                
78 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 n.7 (1981) (quoting Corning, 56 U.S. 
at 268). 
79 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
80 See id. at 130–31 (rejecting claim to combination of bacteria species 
because “[t]hey serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite 
independently of any effort of the patentee”).  
81 See id. at 132. 
82 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978); cf. STEWART SHAPIRO, THINKING 
ABOUT MATHEMATICS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS (2000) (treating 
mathematical objects as paradigmatic examples of noncausal abstractions). 
83 See ELISHA S. LOOMIS, THE PYTHAGOREAN PROPOSITION (1968) (presenting 
367 ways of proving the Pythagorean Theorem). 
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Some applications of the Pythagorean Theorem are patentable. 
For example, the “Cube Puzzle With Moving Faces” of U.S. Patent 
4,872,682 is a product that can be made and used for beneficial 
entertainment and educational purposes.84 It includes springs for 
creating frictional forces between the sliding pieces and the 
channels in which they slide as the faces of the cube are turned 
manually.85 These and other built mechanisms for transmitting 
forces among the cube components can be accurately characterized 
as means for causing the beneficial behavior of the cube. This is 
true even though the Pythagorean Theorem can be used to verify 
that a slider in the middle layer of the cube is dimensioned so that 
it will not slide out of the mechanism when the top or bottom layer 
is rotated.86 The claimed cube puzzle is a patent-eligible “method 
or means” for causing beneficial configurations when its faces are 
rotated by manual forces. 
In contrast, consider a hypothetical patent claim directed to a 
kinematic chain comprising three sequentially linked members 
each having a given length, the longest of which is the square root 
of the sum of the squares of the two shorter lengths, whereby the 
members are constrained to form a right triangle when the linkage 
is closed. If the term “member” in such a claim refers to any 
structural element capable of being modeled geometrically as a 
line segment of a given length without limitation as to the forces 
that may operate on the member in use, then the claim effectively 
preempts all uses of the Pythagorean Theorem in the field of 
mechanical linkages. Since the Pythagorean Theorem is a property 
that obtains in the world regardless of human intervention, the 
claim should be found unpatentable under the “method or means” 
requirement. 
C. Harmonization with Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
The “method or means” requirement is a unifying principle that 
adheres to the Supreme Court’s recent software patent 
jurisprudence in Bilski and Alice. The requirement, which closely 
                                                
84 U.S. Patent No. 4,872,682 (filed Nov. 17, 1987) at col. 4. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at cols. 8–9. 
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tracks “the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr,”87 supports the 
use of the machine-or-transformation test as an important, but not 
definitive inquiry, in abstract-idea jurisprudence88 and clarifies the 
role of the abstract-idea exclusion in guarding against inapposite 
inquiries into novelty and nonobviousness.89 
In Benson, the Court distinguished phenomena of nature and 
abstract ideas from their “application . . . to a new and useful 
end.”90 A claim to a phenomenon of nature, such as the rejected 
claim in O’Reilly v. Morse,91 manifests itself by coverage so broad 
that “it matters not by what process or machinery the result is 
accomplished.”92 Similarly, the Court found Benson’s challenged 
claims “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and 
unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion,” and processes 
that could “be performed through any existing machinery or 
future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.”93 In contrast, 
the claimed chemical tanning and dyeing processes in Corning 
were “sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within 
rather definite bounds.”94 
The Court’s reasoning in Benson applies with equal force to 
any claim that fails the “method or means” requirement. Logically, 
it is only with respect to a claim directed to a “practical method or 
means of producing a beneficial result or effect” that coverage is 
contingent on “by what process or machinery the result is 
accomplished.”95 
In Flook, the Supreme Court credited the patent applicant with 
finding “a new and presumably better method for calculating alarm 
limit values”96 by applying a new algebraic formula to variables 
                                                
87 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 621 (2010). 
88 Id. 
89 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
90 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. 
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
91 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
92 Id. at 113. 
93 Benson, 409 U.S. at 68. 
94 Id. at 69. 
95 Id. at 68 (quoting Morse, 56 U.S. at 113). 
96 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978). 
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involved in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons.97 The Court 
characterized the applicant’s new algorithm as an expression of a 
scientific principle that “reveals a relationship that has always 
existed,”98 like Newton’s equation expressing the law of universal 
gravitation,99 and the algorithm therefore must be “assumed to be 
within the prior art.”100 The Court’s conclusion—that a “merely 
heretofore unknown” expression of a “theretofore existing 
phenomenon or relationship”101 is not the kind of “‘discover[y]’ 
that the statute was enacted to protect”102—applies with equal force 
to any property or principle (such as the Pythagorean Theorem) 
that obtains in the world regardless of whether or not any 
intervening causal act takes place.103 
In Diehr, the Supreme Court found a process of curing 
synthetic rubber that used the well-known Arrhenius’ equation to 
determine the appropriate cure time as patent-eligible.104 Noting 
that “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different 
state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that 
does not include particular machines,”105 the Court characterized 
Diehr’s claimed invention as a patent-eligible process involving 
“the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured 
synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing.”106 
The Court distinguished the claimed invention from a 
mathematical equation, noting that the claim would only “foreclose 
from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the 
other steps in their claimed process.”107 Such “steps” included 
“installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly 
determining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating 
the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a 
                                                
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 593 n. 15 (citation omitted). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 594. 
101 Id. at 590, 593 n. 15. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
105 Id. at 184 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the proper 
time.”108 These steps can be accurately characterized as comprising 
a practical method for causing the rubber to be cured. More 
generally, any process that causes the beneficial “transformation of 
an article . . . into a different state or thing” constitutes a “method 
or means of producing a beneficial result or effect.” 
In accordance with Bilski’s precepts, the “method or means” 
requirement not only follows “the guideposts in Benson, Flook, 
and Diehr,”109 but also provides a rationale for treating the Federal 
Circuit’s erstwhile machine-or-transformation test as a “useful 
and important clue” to guide the abstract-idea inquiry.110 The 
transformation prong, which calls for “a particular transformation 
of a specific article,” 111  simply represents the physical 
manifestation of a concrete beneficial difference in the state of the 
world that is produced by the claimed invention. Moreover, while 
the Federal Circuit never specified the criteria necessary for 
satisfying the machine prong of the test,112 a claimed machine 
might reasonably be deemed patentably concrete by virtue of a 
                                                
108 Id. 
109 As other scholars have observed, a significant difficulty in interpreting 
Bilski is that the last two of the “guideposts in Benson, Flook and Diehr” are not 
in alignment. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: 
Diagnostics, Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341, 
343 (2013) (observing that Diehr and Flook “reach opposing conclusions on 
similar facts and are difficult to reconcile”); John M. Golden, Flook Says One 
Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable 
Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2014) (noting the “clear 
tensions . . . between the differing language and holdings of Diehr and its 
predecessor Flook”); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1315, 1335–36 (2011) (noting that Flook’s point of novelty approach was 
“essentially overruled a few years later in Diehr”). The foregoing discussion, 
however, shows how each case on its own terms can be reconciled with the 
“method and means” requirement. Cf. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2012) (distinguishing Flook from Diehr based on how 
the Flook Court “characterized the claimed process”). 
110  See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 658–59 (2010) (noting Court 
consensus on status of the machine-or-transformation test). 
111 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
112 See id. at 994 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“We aren’t told when, or if, 
software instructions implemented on a general purpose computer are deemed 
‘tied’ to a ‘particular machine.’”). 
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user’s ability to produce a beneficial difference in the state of the 
world.  
Finally, Alice draws an especially sharp distinction between a 
patent-eligible “method or means” of causing a beneficial change 
in the state of the world113 and an ineligible “result or effect” that 
obtains in the world regardless of whether or not such intervening 
acts takes place. 114  In the context of software solutions, the 
“method or means” requirement forces patent claims to be limited 
in scope and directed to specific entities and processes whose 
effects in the real world are learned through empirical observation, 
not stipulated as mathematical properties of abstract models or of 
computer system components disclosed in “purely functional and 
generic”115 terms.  
It bears noting that the computer science community is already 
prepared to lend its expertise to such an inquiry. The requirement 
that a patentable invention be “causal” closely corresponds to a 
distinction that philosophers of computer science, most notably 
James Fetzer116 and Aaron Sloman,117 have drawn among different 
kinds of machine abstractions, and even different areas of 
computing research. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court long ago articulated a simple, generally 
applicable doctrine defining the scope of patent-eligible subject 
matter that can provide considerable clarity to the allowable extent 
                                                
113 See Alice v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (finding that the 
method claims do not “purport to improve the functioning of the computer 
itself” or “any other technology or technical field”). 
114 See id. (finding that the method claims “simply recite the concept of 
intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer.”). 
115 Id. at 2360. 
116 See James H. Fetzer, Program Verification: The Very Idea, 31 COMMUNICATIONS 
OF THE ACM 1048, 1057 (1988) (describing the “causal factors” underlying the 
performance of a simple compiler-ready Pascal program). 
117 See Aaron Sloman, What Cognitive Scientists Need to Know About Virtual 
Machines, in PROC. 31ST ANN. CONF. COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 1210, 1214–15 
(N.A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn, eds. 2009) (arguing that running virtual machines 
supervene on a complex of physical causal processes whose emergent behavior 
is not amenable to mathematical verification). 
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of abstraction in software patent claims: “It is for the discovery or 
invention of some practical method or means of producing a 
beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the 
result or effect itself.”118  
Unfortunately, since the 1960s the courts and the Patent Office 
have been distracted from this clear categorical distinction by the 
recurring specter of the “new machine” principle. Of course, just as 
not all software is mathematics,119 not every software patent is 
predicated on the “new machine” principle or the miscasting of 
mathematics as one of the “useful Arts.” As I have shown, 
however, both the “new machine” principle and the category 
mistake that gave rise to it attended the birth of the first software 
patent. As Alice lays the ghost to rest, it is time for the courts to 
recognize the original rationale for software patent-eligibility in 
Bernhart as a mistake that will never again be repeated.  
                                                
118 Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1853). 
119 See Andrew Chin, On Abstraction and Equivalence in Software Patent 
Doctrine: A Response to Bessen, Meurer and Klemens, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
197, 233–37 (2009) (citing Ben Klemens, The Rise of the Information Processing 
Patent, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2008)) (responding to Ben Klemens’s 
claim that “all software is mathematics”). 
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